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Shielding Children From Nudity, But Not Violence 
. . . Do Minors’ First Amendment Rights Make Sense? 
Vincent S. Onorato  
INTRODUCTION 
Historically, children have been exposed to violence by authors 
and directors who have depicted violence as a central theme,
1
 
whether it has been words within literature
2
 or visual images within 
movies.
3
 As technology has continued to evolve in the modern era, 
video games have surfaced as a new form of media.
4
 These video 
games, similar to literature and movies, have also seemed to place 
violence at the forefront, exposing children to even more violence.
5
 
 
  J.D. Candidate (2013), Washington University School of Law; B.S. (2010), Miami 
University. I would like to thank my family for their support both while writing this Note and 
throughout law school; I could not have gotten through either without them. In addition, I 
would like to thank the staff of the Washington University Journal of Law & Policy for all their 
help during the publication process of this Note. 
 1. Am. Amusement Machine Ass’n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 577 (7th Cir. 2001) 
(discussing how “violence has always been and remains a central interest of humankind and a 
recurrent, even obsessive theme of culture,” which “engages the interest of children from an 
early age”). 
 2. See, e.g., id. (“[T]he Odyssey, with its graphic descriptions of Odysseus’s grinding out 
the eye of Polyphemus with a heated, sharpened stake, killing the suitors, and hanging the 
treacherous maidservants; or The Divine Comedy with its graphic descriptions of the tortures of 
the damned; or War and Peace with its graphic descriptions of execution by firing squad, death 
in childbirth, and death from war wounds.”).  
 3. See, e.g., id. (“Or . . . the famous horror movies made from the classic novels of Mary 
Wollstonecraft Shelley (Frankenstein) and Bram Stoker (Dracula).”).  
 4. See Scott A. Pyle, Is Violence Really Just Fun and Games?: A Proposal For A Violent 
Video Game Ordinance That Passes Constitutional Muster, 37 VAL. U. L. REV. 429, 430 (2002) 
(“Video games have clearly become a permanent and prevalent fixture in the life of a staggering 
number of children in the United States. Studies have indicated that an estimated seventy-nine 
percent of American children play computer or video games an average of eight hours per 
week.”).  
 5. See Emily R. Caron, Blood, Guts, & the First Amendment: Regulating Violence in the 
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Yet, unlike literature and movies, the highly interactive nature of 
video games allows players to control the gruesome violence that 
occurs.
6
 This has led some states to question whether regulations 
need to be in place to censor children from exposure to this extreme 
violence.
7
 
California is the most recent state to enact a statute aimed at 
protecting children from violent video games. Specifically, on 
October 7, 2005, then-California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger 
signed into law Assembly Bill 1179 (“A.B. 1179”),8 codified at Civil 
Code §§ 1746–1746.5.9 In short, the law had the effect of labeling 
violent video games “adult only” and prohibited retailers from 
renting or selling them to anyone under age eighteen.
10
 In response to 
the proposed bill, the video game and software industries filed suit 
against the Governor, on the grounds that the Act violated the First 
 
Entertainment Media, 11 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 89, 91 (2001) (explaining that “American 
children are being exposed to violent entertainment at an alarming rate”).  
 6. See Rashid Sayed, 15 Most Violent Video Games That Made You Puke, GAMINGBOLT 
(May 2, 2010), http://gamingbolt.com/15-most-violent-video-games-that-made-you-puke. Five 
of the fifteen games listed: (1) Soldier of Fortune 2: “You can simple [sic] tear off [sic], chop 
off, and do any damn thing with your victims;” id. (2) Fallout 3: “You can decide which part of 
the body of your enemy you want to blow up;” id. (3) Shadow of Rome: “[Y]our aim is to 
master the art of a Gladiator” which allows you to use “human arm and legs as weapons;” id. 
(4) God of War 3: “[Mr. Kratos] chops off Hermes limbs just to get his pair of magical shoes;” 
id. (5) Heavy Rain: “Allows you to see “[h]ow far you will go to save someone you love? Will 
you chop [off] your own finger?” Id.  
 7. See James Dunkelberger, The New Resident Evil? State Regulation of Violent Video 
Games and The First Amendment, 2011 BYU L. REV. 1659, 1693 n.4 (2011) (“Numerous states 
and political subdivisions [such as California, Illinois, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Oklahoma, Washington, the city of Indianapolis, and St. Louis County, Missouri] have passed 
legislation seeking to restrict minors’ access to violent video games.”). 
 8. See Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 953 (9th Cir. 
2009). “A.B. 1179 states that the State of California has two compelling interests that support 
the Act: (1) preventing violent, aggressive, and antisocial behavior; and (2) preventing 
psychological or neurological harm to minors who play violent video games.” Id. at 954.  
 9. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1746–1746.5 prohibits the sale or rental of “violent video games” 
to minors, and requires their packaging to be labeled. The Act covers games “in which the 
range of options available to a player includes killing, maiming, dismembering, or sexually 
assaulting an image of a human being, if those acts are depicted” in a manner that “[a] 
reasonable person, considering the game as a whole, would find appeals to a deviant or morbid 
interest of minors,” that is “patently offensive to prevailing standards in the community as to 
what is suitable for minors,” and that “causes the game, as a whole, to lack serious literary, 
artistic, political, or scientific value for minors.” 
 10. Id. The law also imposed a fine on violators of up to $1,000 per offense. § 1746.3. 
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Amendment.
11
 The suit led to the recent U.S. Supreme Court 
decision, Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association.
12
 
In Brown, the Supreme Court considered “whether a California 
law imposing restrictions on violent video games comports with the 
First Amendment.”13 In answering this question, Justice Scalia, 
writing for the majority, held that the California statute was 
unconstitutional.
14
 In doing so, he refused to expand the Ginsberg v. 
New York standard
15
 to include violence. Instead, the Court looked to 
United States v. Stevens
16
 as the controlling precedent, thereby 
employing strict scrutiny
17
 to strike down the California statute as 
violating the First Amendment.
18
 The Court reaffirmed various lower 
court decisions that had decided similar First Amendment issues 
involving video games.
19
 Therefore, the decision to grant certiorari 
 
 11. Video Software Dealers Ass’n, 556 F.3d at 955. The video game and software 
industries also argued that the Act violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment, 
however the scope of this Note is limited to First Amendment issues, in particular with respect 
minors.  
 12. 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).  
 13. Id. at 2732.  
 14. See id. at 2738.  
 15. 390 U.S. 629, 636 (1968). The Supreme Court created the Ginsberg (obscenity-for-
minors) standard, which barred the dissemination to children of obscene material that was 
constitutionally protected for distribution to adults. For a more complete discussion of the 
Ginsberg standard, see infra notes 46–51. 
 16. 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1586 (2010) (explaining that new categories of unprotected speech 
may not be added to the list by a legislature that concludes certain speech is too harmful to be 
tolerated). For a more complete discussion on Stevens infra see notes 57–62. 
 17. William Cross, Hot Coffee and Freeze-Dried First Amendment Analysis: The Dubious 
Constitutionality of Using Private Ratings for Public Regulation of Video Games, 4 FIRST 
AMEND. L. REV. 299, 321 n.87 (2005) (explaining that “[s]trict scrutiny is the highest standard 
of review for a law. Under strict scrutiny a regulation is presumed to be invalid and the state 
bears the burden of demonstrating that the law is necessary to further a compelling state 
interest.”).  
 Under strict scrutiny, legislation imposing a restriction on the content of protected speech 
will be upheld against constitutional challenge only if “necessary” or “narrowly tailored” to 
promote a “compelling” governmental interest. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn. 505 U.S. 
377, 395–96 (1992). For a more complete discussion of strict scrutiny, see infra notes 77–92. 
 18. See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2742. The majority stated that California failed to produce 
any objective scientific evidence that exposure to video game violence harms children. Id. at 
2739. The state therefore failed to prove it had a compelling governmental interest in protecting 
minors from such exposure. Id. Moreover, the majority asserted that even if California were 
able to demonstrate the existence of that causal link between violent speech and harm to 
minors, the statute nonetheless would be unconstitutional because it is not narrowly tailored 
(the statute is both underinclusive and overinclusive) to achieve its goal. Id. at 2739–41.  
 19. David Post, Sex, Lies, and Videogames: Brown v. Entertainment Merchants 
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and the ruling were both strange in that they added nothing additional 
to lower courts’ holdings, all of which had unanimously struck down 
similar statutes for failure to pass strict scrutiny.
20
 
By applying the holding in Stevens,
21
 and the reasoning
22
 for 
refusing to apply the Ginsberg standard, Brown has further 
complicated the problematic First Amendment standard
23
 for minors. 
As Justice Breyer’s dissent makes clear, the current law permits the 
shielding of minors from mere nudity, but does not allow minors to 
be shielded from extreme violence—a serious “anomaly.”24 The 
 
Association, CATO SUP. CT. REV. 27, 38 (2011). Explaining why granting certiorari and holding 
in the way the U.S. Supreme Court did was unusual:  
When the Supreme Court granted California’s cert petition in April 2010, Court-
watchers were left scratching their heads: Why did the Court agree to hear the case? 
The lower courts had been unanimous thus far; every court . . . that had considered 
similar (or identical) statutes had (1) applied strict scrutiny and (2) struck them down 
as violating the First Amendment . . . Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Swanson, 519 F.3d 768 
(8th Cir. 2008); Interactive Digital Software Ass’n v. St. Louis County, 329 F.3d 954 
(8th Cir. 2003); Am. Amusement Mach. Ass’n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 534 U.S. 994 (2001); Entm’t Merchants Ass’n v. Henry, No. Civ-06-675-
C, 2007 WL 2743097 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 17, 2007); Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Foti, 451 
F. Supp. 2d 823 (M.D. La. 2006); Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Granholm, 426 F. Supp. 
2d 646 (E.D. Mich. 2006); Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 404 F. Supp. 2d 
1051 (N.D. Ill. 2005), aff’d, 469 F.3d 641 (7th Cir. 2006); Video Software Dealers 
Ass’n v. Maleng, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1180 (W.D. Wash. 2004). 
Id. 
 20. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.  
 21. See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2747 (Alito, J., concurring) (stating reasons why the Court 
was wrong in saying that the holding in Stevens controls this case). See generally infra Part II.  
 22. See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2738 (reasoning that the interactive nature of video games 
allowing the player to participate in the violent action on screen and determine its outcome is 
nothing new: since at least the publication of The Adventures of You: Sugarcane Island in 1969, 
young readers of choose-your-own-adventure stories have been able to make decisions that 
determine the plot by following instructions about which page to turn to).  
 23. THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 718 (Random House 
1970) (“The Court’s inability to develop a comprehensive theory of the First Amendment 
leaves it without satisfactory tools to deal with many new developments that are emerging in 
the system of freedom of expression.”).  
 24. See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2771 (Breyer, J., dissenting)  
The majority’s different conclusion creates a serious anomaly in First Amendment law. 
Ginsberg makes clear that a State can prohibit the sale to minors of depictions of 
nudity; today the Court makes clear that a State cannot prohibit the sale to minors of 
the most violent interactive video games. But what sense does it make to forbid selling 
to a 13 year old boy a magazine with an image of a nude woman, while protecting a 
sale to that 13 year old of an interactive video game in which he actively, but virtually, 
binds and gags the woman, then tortures and kills her? What kind of First Amendment 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol41/iss1/8
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Supreme Court made a mistake and should have made one of two 
more logically based arguments: (1) placing violence within the 
Ginsberg standard; or (2) overruling the Ginsberg standard 
completely. Each would correct the Court’s mistake by eliminating 
the current “anomaly,” thus creating a more consistent First 
Amendment standard for minors.
25
 Consequently, because of this 
decision, there will continue to be much uncertainty and 
inconsistency in future First Amendment cases involving minors.  
Part I of this Note begins by delving into the history of the First 
Amendment, beginning with what it looked like in the eyes of the 
framers to its current construction. Part I next explores the case law, 
which helped form the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown. Part II 
starts with an analysis of the case law used by the Supreme Court in 
Brown. It argues that the Court was incorrect both in its reasoning 
and ultimate holding that nudity and violence are to be judged by 
different standards with respect to minors. Part II closes by 
illustrating the problem of the current state of minors’ First 
Amendment rights as a result of Brown. Finally, Part III proposes two 
possible solutions the Supreme Court in Brown could have made to 
solve the inconsistency of minors’ First Amendment rights. The first 
possible solution is to apply the obscenity-for-minors standard from 
Ginsberg to violence, thereby eliminating the application of strict 
scrutiny.
26
 Accordingly, this solution suggests that violence be treated 
as obscenity for minors. The second possible solution is more 
extreme, advocating that the Supreme Court overrule its decision in 
Ginsberg, giving children and adults the same First Amendment 
rights. 
 
would permit the government to protect children by restricting sales of that extremely 
violent video game only when the woman—bound, gagged, tortured, and killed—is 
also topless? 
Id. 
 25. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997) (explaining that in most matters it is 
more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled rightly; however, 
when interpreting the Constitution, that policy is at its weakest, and it is more important to be 
settled rightly).  
 26. This solution is similar to the approach advocated by Justice Breyer in his dissenting 
opinion. However, it differs in that it places emphasis on the offensiveness of violence instead 
of the resulting harm that violence can cause. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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I. HISTORY 
A. The First Amendment 
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution states: 
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”27 
Enacted in 1791, “[t]he First Amendment undoubtedly was a reaction 
against the suppression of speech and of the press that existed in 
English society.”28 Besides knowing this, however, it is extremely 
difficult to ascertain what the framers specifically intended with the 
creation of the First Amendment.
29
 Today, the most basic principle of 
the First Amendment is that “as a general matter . . . government has 
no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its 
subject matter, or its content.”30 However, the courts have established 
that “the First Amendment . . . permit[s] restrictions upon the content 
of speech in a few limited areas.”31 Obscenity, formally introduced in 
1957, represents one of those few limited areas.
32
  
The California statute
33
 in Brown sought to impose restrictions on 
minors’ ability to purchase violent video games by attempting to 
 
 27. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The scope of this Note is tailored to the freedom of speech 
provision within the First Amendment.  
 28. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 950 (Vicki 
Been et al. eds., 4th ed. 2011). 
 29. See id. at 952–53 (“Not surprisingly, then, Supreme Court cases dealing with freedom 
of expression focus less on the framers’ intent than do cases involving many other 
constitutional provisions . . . [Thus], the courts must decide what speech is protected by the 
First Amendment and what can be regulated by the government.”). 
 30. See Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002).  
 31. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2733 (noting that defamation, fraud, incitement, and fighting 
words are also limited areas where the First Amendment has permitted restrictions). For the 
purposes of this Note, obscenity is the only unprotected class that is discussed. 
 32. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957). See also KEVIN W. SAUNDERS, 
VIOLENCE AS OBSCENITY 45 (Rodney A. Smolla et al. eds., 1996) (“[E]arlier decisions . . . had 
assumed obscene material was not protected by freedom of speech . . . but Roth [in 1957] 
squarely so held.”). But see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 28, at 1050 (“Many disagree with the 
Court that obscenity should be deemed a category of unprotected speech. They argue that the 
very definition of obscenity . . . focuses on controlling thoughts—something that should be 
beyond the reach of the government.”). 
 33. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1746–1746.5 (West 2009), declared unconstitutional by Brown v. 
Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol41/iss1/8
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place it within the obscenity exception.
34
 The Supreme Court began 
its opinion by stating that video games qualify for First Amendment 
protection.
35
 It then faced two key issues. The first issue was should 
the Court place violence within the obscenity-for-minors standard 
from Ginsberg. Then, if it does not, the second issue was whether the 
California statute satisfies the strict scrutiny standard.
36
 In First 
Amendment cases involving obscenity, most litigation is associated 
with whether the obscenity exception can be expanded to new forms 
of speech, and if not, then whether the proposed regulation can meet 
the strict scrutiny standard.
37
 Unique to cases like Brown is that the 
litigation deals more narrowly with whether the Ginsberg standard 
can be expanded.
38
 
B. The Obscenity Exception 
In 1957, the Supreme Court in Roth v. United States
39
 first 
formally recognized obscenity as a form of unprotected speech.
40
 In 
declaring obscene material unprotected under the First Amendment, 
the Court found that the state had a compelling interest in guarding 
society from obscenity.
41
 Stemming from Roth was a definition of 
 
 34. See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2734 (noting that California tried to make violent-speech 
regulation look like obscenity regulation by mimicking the New York statute regulating 
obscenity for minors).  
 35. See id. at 2733 (“Like the protected books, plays, and movies that preceded them, 
video games communicate ideas—and even social messages—through many familiar literary 
devices (such as characters, dialogue, plot, and music) and through features distinctive to the 
medium (such as the player’s interaction with the virtual world). That suffices to confer First 
Amendment protection.”). See also Interactive Digital Software Ass’n v. St. Louis Cnty., 329 
F.3d 954, 958 (8th Cir. 2003) (“[Video games] are as much entitled to the protection of free 
speech as the best of literature.”).  
 36. See generally Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2735, 2738.  
 37. See generally, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010); Winters v. New 
York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948). 
 38. See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2735. See also supra note 19 and accompanying text.  
 39. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).  
 40. See id. at 485. 
 41.  Id. at 484 (noting that implicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection 
of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance). “[S]uch utterances are no 
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that 
any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order 
and morality . . . .” Id. at 485 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 
(1942)). 
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obscenity that clearly tied the concept to sex.
42
 Sixteen years later, the 
Supreme Court limited the obscenity standard in Miller v. 
California.
43
 The Court was concerned with the inherent dangers of 
regulating any form of expression.
44
 Thus, the basic guidelines for the 
trier of fact became and remain today:  
(a) whether the average person, applying contemporary 
community standards would find that the work, taken as a 
whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work 
depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual 
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and 
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, 
artistic, political, or scientific value.
45
 
C. The Ginsberg (Obscenity-for-Minors) Standard 
Although a standard by which to judge obscenity seemed to be 
solidified in Miller, the Supreme Court placed a wrinkle in obscenity 
years earlier in Ginsberg v. New York
46
 when it created a separate 
obscenity standard for minors.
47
 In Ginsberg the Court recognized 
that the concept of obscenity may vary according to whom the 
questionable material is directed or from whom it is quarantined.
48
 It 
 
 42. See SAUNDERS, supra note 32, at 63. 
 43. 413 U.S. 15, 27 (1973). The Court confined the permissible scope of such regulation 
to works that depict or describe patently offensive “hard core” sexual conduct. Id. 
 44. Id. at 23–24.  
 45. Id. at 24 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 46. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).  
 47. In Ginsberg, the Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s holding that magazines, 
which were sold to a sixteen-year-old boy, containing pictures depicting the showing of female 
buttocks with less than a fully opaque covering, or the showing of the female breast with less 
than a fully opaque covering any portion thereof below the top of the nipple was defined as 
obscene even though it was not considered obscene to adults. See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 631–
33.  
 48. Id. at 636. New York Penal Law § 484-h provided that:  
It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to sell or loan for monetary 
consideration to a minor: (a) any picture, photograph, drawing, sculpture, motion 
picture film, or similar visual representation or image of a person or portion of the 
human body which depicts nudity, sexual conduct or sadomasochistic abuse and which 
is harmful to minors, or (b) any book, pamphlet, magazine, printed matter however 
reproduced, or sound recording which contains any matter enumerated in paragraph 
(a) of subdivision two hereof, or explicit and detailed verbal descriptions or narrative 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol41/iss1/8
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stated, “that even where there is an invasion of protected freedoms 
the power of the state to control the conduct of children reaches 
beyond the scope of its authority over adults.”49 The Court decided it 
could exercise its power to protect the health, safety, welfare, and 
morals of its community by barring distribution to children of books 
recognized to be suitable for adults.
50
 Thus, in establishing a separate 
obscenity-for-minors standard, the Court recognized that the well-
being of children was within the State’s constitutional power to 
regulate.
51
 
D. Restrictions on Violent Speech 
Obscenity statutes in general have generated much uncertainty in 
many First Amendment cases because of the impossibility to 
formulate a definition.
52
 With a separate standard for minors in 
Ginsberg, a new gray area arose as to what First Amendment 
protection minors must receive.
53
 Restrictions targeting violent 
 
accounts of sexual excitement, sexual conduct or sado-masochistic abuse and which, 
taken as a whole is harmful to minors.  
Id. at 647 (quoting New York Penal Law § 484-h). 
 49. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 638.  
 50. Id. at 636. Although the Court barred dissemination of obscene material to minors, the 
Court went on to state that: “the prohibition against sales to minors does not bar parents who so 
desire from purchasing the magazines for their children.” Id. at 639.  
 51. See id. at 639. The Supreme Court further reasoned that even without scientifically 
proven evidence that obscenity is or is not a basic factor in impairing the ethical and moral 
development of youth and a clear and present danger to the people of the state, society’s 
transcendent interest in protecting the welfare of children justifies reasonable regulation of the 
sale of material to them. See id. at 640–43.  
 52. See SAUNDERS, supra note 32, at 63–64 (“[If] [t]he Court’s definition [in Roth], is 
taken to limit obscenity to sexual or eliminatory depictions and descriptions, it is too narrow. 
[However, some have argued] [t]he concept of obscenity extends to other varieties of materials, 
and violent depictions may present as central a paradigm of obscenity as sexual materials.”). 
See also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 28, at 1052 (“[S]ome [even] argue that obscenity should not 
be a category of unprotected expression . . . . Justice Brennan, who wrote the opinion in Roth, 
dissented in Paris Adult Theater and said: ‘I am convinced that the approach initiated 16 years 
ago in Roth . . . cannot bring stability to this area of the law without jeopardizing fundamental 
First Amendment values.’”). 
 53. Compare Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212–13 (1975) (“[M]inors are 
entitled to a significant measure of First Amendment protection, and only in relatively narrow 
and well-defined circumstances may government bar public dissemination of protected 
materials to them.”) (internal citations omitted) with Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 
(1944) (“The power of the state to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of 
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speech have been a recurring issue stuck within these uncertain areas 
of the First Amendment.
54
 In Brown, the majority placed controlling 
weight on two cases involving such an issue on violent speech.
55
 It 
used these cases to narrowly define the Ginsberg standard, excluding 
violence from its purview.
56
 
In Brown, the majority first looked to United States v. Stevens,
57
 a 
recent case in which the Court struck down a statute aimed at 
stopping the distribution of animal cruelty depictions.
58
 In Stevens, 
the Court dealt with whether the prohibition of animal cruelty 
depictions is consistent with the freedom of speech guaranteed by the 
First Amendment.
59
 In support of the statute, the Government argued 
that lack of a historical warrant did not matter and that a categorical 
exclusion for violence should be considered under a simple balancing 
test.
60
 The Supreme Court ultimately rejected the Government’s 
argument for two reasons: first, a new category of unprotected speech 
 
its authority over adults.”), and Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 515 (1969) 
(Stewart, J., concurring) (explaining that the First Amendment rights of minors are not “co-
extensive with those of adults”), and Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 n.11 (1982) 
(finding that juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside 
pressures, including peer pressure, than are adults).  
 54. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. See also Jessalyn Hershinger, State 
Restrictions on Violent Expression: The Impropriety of Extending an Obscenity Analysis, 46 
VAND. L. REV. 473, 474–77 (1993).  
 55. See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2734–35. 
 56. Id. 
 57. 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010). In Brown, Justice Scalia states that the holding in Stevens 
controls the case. Therefore, Justice Scalia’s application and interpretation of Stevens 
determined the ultimate outcome in Brown. See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2734.  
 58. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1592.  
 59. Id. at 1582–83 (explaining that the statute at issue was 18 U.S.C. § 48, which applied 
to any visual or auditory depiction in which a living animal is intentionally maimed, mutilated, 
tortured, wounded, or killed, if that conduct violates federal or state law where the creation, 
sale, or possession takes place). 
 60. Id. at 1585. The Government’s proposed balancing test was: “Whether a given 
category of speech enjoys First Amendment protection depends upon a categorical balancing of 
the value of the speech against its societal costs.” Id. 
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could not be added based on a simple balancing test,
61
 and second, 
the statute was overly broad.
62
 
Next, the majority applied Winters v. New York,
63
 a case dating 
back to 1948 that also dealt with a statute restricting violent speech.
64
 
In reversing the Court of Appeals’ decision,65 the Supreme Court 
struck down the statute on grounds that it failed a heightened 
vagueness standard.
66
 Thus, the Court held that violence did not fall 
within obscenity in this case because of this vagueness and “the utter 
impossibility of the actor or the trier to know where this new standard 
of guilt would draw the line between the allowable and the forbidding 
publications.”67 
 
 61. Id. at 1586 (explaining its decision to exclude child pornography from the protection 
of the First Amendment in New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982)). Specifically, the 
Supreme Court stated: “the State of New York had a compelling interest in protecting children 
from abuse, and . . . the value of using children in these works (as opposed to simulated conduct 
or adult actors) was de minimis.” Id.  
 62. Id. at 1587 (“In the First Amendment context . . . a law may be invalidated as 
overbroad if a substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to 
the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The 
Court specifically explained that the statute at issue is overly broad because it refers to any 
depiction in which a living animal is intentionally maimed, mutilated, tortured, wounded, or 
killed, which could be illegal in some jurisdictions and legal in others. See id. at 1588–89. 
 63. 333 U.S. 507 (1948).  
 64. Id. at 508. New York Penal Law § 1141 stated: “1. A person who prints, 2. Prints, 
utters, publishes, sells, lends, gives away, distributes, or shows, or has in his possession with 
intent to sell, lend, give away, distribute or show, or otherwise offers for sale, loan, gift or 
distribution, any book, pamphlet, magazine, newspaper or other printed paper devoted to the 
publication, and principally made up of criminal news, police reports, or accounts of criminal 
deeds, or pictures, or stories of deeds of bloodshed, lust or crime” is guilty of a misdemeanor 
for obscene prints and articles. Id. 
 65. See id. at 517–18. The Court of Appeals in this case “held that collections of criminal 
deeds of bloodshed or lust ‘can be so massed as to become vehicles for inciting violent and 
depraved crimes against the person and in that case such publications are indecent or obscene in 
an admissible sense.’” Id. at 513. 
 66. Id. at 520 (“Where a statute is so vague as to make criminal an innocent act, a 
conviction under it cannot be sustained.” (citing Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 259 (1937)). 
Moreover, “[t]here must be ascertainable standards of guilt.” Winters, 333 U.S. at 515. “Men of 
common intelligence cannot be required to guess at the meaning of the enactment.” Id. “The 
vagueness may be from uncertainty in regard to persons within the scope of the act, or in regard 
to the applicable tests to ascertain guilt.” Id. at 515–16 (internal citations omitted). “‘Where the 
statute uses words of no determinative meaning, or the language is so general and indefinite as 
to embrace not only acts commonly recognized as reprehensible, but also others which it is 
unreasonable to presume were intended to be made criminal, it will be declared void for 
uncertainty.’” Id. at 516 (quoting State v. Diamond, 27 N.M. 477, 485 (N.M. 1921). 
 67. Winters, 333 U.S. at 519.  
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E. Restrictions on Violent Video Games 
American Amusement Machine Association v. Kendrick
68
 was 
essentially the first case to recognize that video games are no 
different from other forms of media.
69
 In this case, the Seventh 
Circuit dealt with an ordinance barring minors from video arcade 
games containing simulated graphic violence.
70
 Like the California 
statute in Brown, the ordinance tried to place violence within the 
unprotected class of obscenity.
71
 Following Winters, Judge Posner 
struck down the ordinance recognizing that violence is not 
obscenity.
72
 However, he departed from the traditional explanation 
that obscenity must be associated with sex,
73
 even admitting the 
 
 68. 244 F.3d 572 (2001).  
 69. Id. at 577 (“All literature . . . is interactive; the better it is, the more interactive.”).  
 70. See id. at 573.  
The ordinance defines the term “harmful to minors” to mean “an amusement machine 
that predominantly appeals to minors’ morbid interest in violence or minors’ prurient 
interest in sex, is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community as a 
whole with respect to what is suitable material for persons under the age of eighteen 
(18) years, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value as a whole for 
persons under” that age, and contains either “graphic violence” or “strong sexual 
content.” “Graphic violence,” which is all that is involved in this case (so far as 
appears, the plaintiffs do not manufacture, at least for exhibition in game arcades and 
other public places, video games that have “strong sexual content”), is defined to mean 
“an amusement machine’s visual depiction or representation of realistic serious injury 
to a human or human-like being where such serious injury includes amputation, 
decapitation, dismemberment, bloodshed, mutilation, maiming or disfiguration 
[disfigurement].” 
Id. 
 71. Id. at 574 (noting that “the ordinance brackets violence with sex, and the City tries to 
squeeze the provision on violence into a familiar legal pigeonhole, that of obscenity, which is 
normally concerned with sex and is not protected by the First Amendment.”).  
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 574–75. Instead of stating that obscenity can only be associated with sex, Judge 
Posner placed an emphasis on obscenity’s offensiveness: 
Obscenity is to many people disgusting, embarrassing, degrading, disturbing, 
outrageous, and insulting, but it generally is not believed to inflict temporal (as distinct 
from spiritual) harm; or at least the evidence that it does is not generally considered as 
persuasive as the evidence that other speech that can be regulated on the basis of its 
content, such as threats of physical harm, conspiratorial communications, incitements, 
frauds, and libels and slanders, inflicts such harm. 
Id. 
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importance in protecting against violence.
74
 The crux of his argument 
was based upon the City’s underlying purpose for the enactment of 
the ordinance.
75
 Thus, because the City’s purpose for shielding 
children from the violent video games was based on the underlying 
harm, instead of the offensiveness of the violence, the ordinance was 
deemed unconstitutional.
76
 
F. Strict Scrutiny 
As exemplified in the cases above, where the content of speech 
places it in one of the categories of speech protected by the First 
Amendment, strict scrutiny is employed to determine the 
constitutionality of the content-based regulation.
77
 Courts developed 
 
 74. Id. at 575 (“Protecting people from violence is at least as hallowed a role for 
government as protecting people from graphic sexual imagery.”). 
 75. Id. at 574 (noting that “the main worry about obscenity, the main reason for its 
proscription, is not that is it harmful, which is the worry behind the Indianapolis ordinance, but 
that it is offensive”). 
 76. Id. at 575, 580.  
 No proof that obscenity is harmful is required either to defend an obscenity statute 
against being invalidated on constitutional grounds or to uphold a prosecution for 
obscenity. Offensiveness is the offense. 
 One can imagine an ordinance directed at depictions of violence because they, too, 
were offensive. Maybe violent photographs of a person being drawn and quartered 
could be suppressed as disgusting, embarrassing, degrading, or disturbing without 
proof that they were likely to cause any of the viewers to commit a violent act. They 
might even be described as “obscene,” in the same way that photographs of people 
defecating might be, and in many obscenity statutes are, included within the legal 
category of the obscene, even if they have nothing to do with sex. In common speech, 
indeed, “obscene” is often just a synonym for repulsive, with no sexual overtones at all.  
 But offensiveness is not the basis on which Indianapolis seeks to regulate violent 
video games.  
Id. at 575 (internal citations omitted).  
 77. See Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 56 n.12 (1976); see also R.A.V. 
v. St. Paul, Minnesota, 505 U.S. 375, 387 (1992) (“The rationale of the general prohibition 
[against content-based restrictions] is that content discrimination ‘raises the specter that the 
Government may effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace.’” (quoting 
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims Bd., 502 US. 105, 
116 (1991))). But see N.Y. v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763–64 (1982) (“It is not rare that a 
content-based classification of speech has been accepted because it may be appropriately 
generalized that within the confines of the given classification, the evil to be restricted so 
overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive interests, if any, at stake, that no process of case-by-
case adjudication is required.”). 
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the “strict scrutiny” standard in an attempt to determine whether 
content-based restrictions
78
 on protected speech are valid.
79
 In order 
for a statute to be valid under the standard of strict scrutiny, it must 
be narrowly tailored
80
 to promote a compelling Government 
interest,
81
 and “if a less restrictive alternative would serve the 
Government’s purpose, the legislature must use that alternative.”82 
Two cases
83
 help illustrate the application of strict scrutiny as it 
relates to the California statute in Brown.  
In United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, the Supreme 
Court confronted the challenge to a section of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996.
84
 This section required cable 
television operators offering channels dedicated to “sexually-oriented 
programming” to completely scramble or fully block those channels, 
or to limit their transmission to hours when children were unlikely to 
be viewing the program.
85
 The Supreme Court concluded that the
 
 78. “As general rule, laws that by their terms distinguish favored speech from disfavored 
speech on basis of ideas or views expressed are content-based, while laws that confer benefits 
or impose burdens on speech without reference to ideas or views expressed are in most 
instances content-neutral.” 16B C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 827 (citing Turner Broadcasting 
System, Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622 (1994)).  
 79. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011). 
 80. Where a State’s purposes for a proposed legislation affect First Amendment rights 
they must be pursued by means that are neither seriously underinclusive nor seriously 
overinclusive. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993).  
 81. The State must prove an “actual problem” justifying the restriction on speech. See 
United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813, 822 (2000). Furthermore, the 
curtailment of free speech must be actually necessary to the solution. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 
395.  
 82. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 813. “It is rare that a regulation restricting speech because of its 
content will ever be permissible.” Id. at 818.  
 83. (1) Playboy, 529 U.S. at 803, 813; and (2) Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 546.  
 84. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 806. Explaining the purpose behind the enactment of § 505: 
Even before enactment of the statute, signal scrambling was already in use. Cable 
operators used scrambling in the regular course of business, so that only paying 
customers had access to certain programs. Scrambling could be imprecise, however; 
and either or both audio and visual portions of the scrambled programs might be heard 
or seen, a phenomenon known as “signal bleed.” The purpose of § 505 [was] to shield 
children from hearing or seeing images resulting from signal bleed. 
Id. at 803. 
 85. Id. at 806. The time determined when children were unlikely to be viewing set by 
administrative regulation was the time between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m. Id.  
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Government failed to provide any evidence
86
 to prove an actual 
problem
87
 and that the Government could further those interests in 
less restrictive ways.
88
 The Court reasoned that in order for the cable 
providers to comply with the section, too much speech would be 
restricted.
89
 Therefore, even though the speech was indecent and 
entered the home, because of the lack of evidence of an actual 
problem,
90
 the objective of shielding children did not suffice to 
support a blanket ban if the protection could be accomplished by a 
less restrictive alternative.
91
 
In Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, the Supreme Court 
considered ordinances passed targeting the practice of Santeria
92
 
forbidding the unnecessary killing of “an animal in a public or private 
ritual or ceremony not for the primary purpose of food 
 
 86. Id. at 820 (explaining the district court’s finding that the Government presented no 
evidence on the number of households actually exposed to signal bleed; all the Government 
presented was a handful of isolated incidents over sixteen years, with no survey-type evidence 
on the magnitude of the problem).  
 87. Id. at 822–23 (“The question is whether an actual problem has been proved in this 
case. We agree that the Government has failed to establish a pervasive, nationwide problem 
justifying its nationwide daytime speech ban.”).  
 88. Id. at 809–10 (noting that “[o]ne plausible, less restrictive alternative could be found 
in another section of the Act: § 504, which requires a cable operator, upon request by a cable 
service subscriber . . . without charge, to fully scramble or otherwise fully block any channel 
the subscriber does not wish to receive”). “Where a plausible, less restrictive alternative is 
offered to a content-based speech restriction, it is the Government’s obligation to prove that the 
alternative will be ineffective to achieve its goals.” Id. at 816. 
 89. Id. at 812. The Supreme Court’s explanation: 
It is evident that the only reasonable way for a substantial number of cable operators to 
comply with the letter of § 505 is to time channel, which silences the protected speech 
for two-thirds of the day in every home in a cable service area, regardless of the 
presence or likely presence of children or of the wishes of the viewers . . . To prohibit 
this much speech is a significant restriction of communication between speakers and 
willing adult listeners, communication which enjoys First Amendment protection. 
Id. 
 90. Id. at 822 (noting that “[t]his is not to suggest that a 10,000 page record must be 
compiled in every case or that the Government must delay in acting to address a real problem; 
but the Government must present more than anecdote and supposition”).  
 91. Id. at 814.  
 92. See Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 524 (1993). “The basis of the Santeria religion is the 
nurture of a personal relation with the orishas [gods], and one of the principal forms of devotion 
is an animal sacrifice.” Id. The orishas, or gods, depend on sacrifice for survival. Id. at 524–25. 
“Sacrifices are performed at birth, marriage, and death rites, for the cure of the sick, for the 
initiation of new members and priests, and during an annual celebration.” Id. at 525.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
166 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 41:151 
 
 
consumption.”93 The City, backing the ordinances, argued that they 
advanced two interests: protecting the public health and preventing 
cruelty to animals.
94
 The Court disagreed and struck down the 
ordinances as unconstitutional, stating that they did not meet the strict 
scrutiny standard
95
 because the ordinances were both overinclusive
96
 
and underinclusive.
97
  
II. ANALYSIS 
In Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, the Supreme 
Court struck down a California statute that banned the sale of certain 
violent video games to children without parental supervision.
98
 In 
support of the California statute, the State argued that violence should 
be treated as obscenity for minors because of the underlying harm 
both can cause to children.
99
 The Court disagreed, stating that 
violence is not obscenity and classified the statute as a content-based 
regulation, which subsequently failed strict scrutiny.
100
  
In Brown, the Court analyzed the uncertainty surrounding minors’ 
First Amendment rights
101
 and the obscenity exception.
102
 Both have 
perplexed courts since the formation of obscenity in Roth,
103
 along 
 
 93. Id. at 526–27.  
 94. Id. at 543.  
 95. Id. at 547.  
 96. Id. at 537–38 (explaining that the ordinances are overinclusive because the “legitimate 
governmental interests in protecting the public health and preventing cruelty to animals could 
be addressed by restrictions stopping far short of a flat prohibition of all Santeria sacrificial 
practice”).  
 97. Id. at 543. The Supreme Court explained why the ordinances are underinclusive:  
 They fail to prohibit nonreligious conduct that endangers these interests in a similar 
or greater degree than Santeria sacrifice does. . . . Despite the city’s proffered interest 
in preventing cruelty to animals, the ordinances are drafted with care to forbid few 
killings but those occasioned by religious sacrifice. Many types of animal deaths or 
kills for nonreligious reasons are either not prohibited or approved by express 
provision. Id. For example, fishing—which occurs in Hialeah—is legal.  
Id. (citation omitted). 
 98. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2742 (2011).  
 99. See Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 954, 958 (2009).  
 100. See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2735, 2742. 
 101. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.  
 102. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.  
 103. See supra notes 39–42 and accompanying text. 
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with the refinements in Miller
104
 and Ginsberg.
105
 Attempting to 
curtail this uncertainty, the majority placed controlling weight on its 
opinion in Stevens,
106
 stating, “new categories of unprotected speech 
may not be added to the list.”107 The majority then buttressed its 
argument from Stevens with its opinion from Winters,
108
 which 
“made clear that violence is not part of the obscenity.”109 Thus, the 
Court concluded that “[b]ecause speech about violence is not 
obscene, it is of no consequence that California’s statute mimics the 
New York statute regulating obscenity-for-minors that we upheld in 
Ginsberg v. New York.”110  
As Justice Alito points out in his concurring opinion, the majority 
in Brown improperly placed controlling weight on Stevens.
111
 Similar 
 
 104. See supra notes 43–45 and accompanying text. See also Post, supra note 19, at 31–32. 
Explaining the confusing features of the Miller standard:  
First, . . . it doesn’t enable you to look at any particular item and answer the question, 
“Is this photograph, or magazine, or video ‘obscene’ and thus unprotected by the First 
Amendment?” Instead, it specifies the process that the government must follow when it 
gets around to defining something as obscene. Second, by . . . applying contemporary 
community standards . . . the Miller standard clearly contemplates that First 
Amendment protection will expand and contract as one moves from one community to 
another.  
Id.  
 105. See supra notes 46–51 and accompanying text. See also Post, supra note 19, at 36. 
Explaining that Ginsberg introduced even more confusion into the exception:  
Ginsberg, . . . technically speaking, isn’t a First Amendment case at all—it’s a not First 
Amendment case. It’s about the regulation of unprotected speech—speech that is 
obscene as to minors—about which the First Amendment has nothing to say (at least, 
when the state regulates its distribution to minors). 
Id. 
 106. See Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1586.  
 107. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2734 (2011) (citing Stevens, 
130 S. Ct. at 1586). 
 108. See Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 519–20 (1948). 
 109. See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2735 (“Our opinion in Winters, which concluded that the 
New York Statute failed a heightened vagueness standard applicable to restrictions upon speech 
entitled to First Amendment protection, made clear that violence is not part of . . . 
obscenity. . . .”) (citations omitted).  
 110. Id.  
 111. Id. at 2747. Although Justice Alito concluded that the California violent video game 
law failed to provide the fair notice that the Constitution requires, he still recognized that the 
Court was wrong in saying that the holding in Stevens controls this case for three reasons. Id. at 
2746–47.  
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to what Justice Alito advocates, there are two additional reasons why 
Stevens does not apply. First, the subject of the statute in Stevens 
related to the selling of animal cruelty depictions to all individuals, 
whereas the statute in Brown involved targeted acts of children 
actively engaging in and creating violence through video games.
112
 
The statute in Brown targeted a much narrower audience—children, 
while also serving a much more important purpose—their well-
being.
113
 Second, unlike the statute in Stevens, which was deemed 
overly broad,
114
 the California statute is not overly broad because it 
was designed to target only games with a rating of M or higher.
115
 
The majority in Brown also improperly applied Winters.
116
 In 
Winters, the Court refused to classify violence as obscenity because 
the statute failed a heightened vagueness standard.
117
 In Brown, 
however, the statute could satisfy a heightened vagueness standard.
118
 
To illustrate, the statute in Winters dealt with dissemination of 
printed material made up of criminal news,
119
 where because of its 
subjective nature, a distributor might not know exactly which story 
he may or may not be punished for.
120
 To the contrary, the statute in 
 
First, the statute in Stevens differed sharply from the statute at issue here. Stevens 
struck down a law that broadly prohibited any person from creating, selling, or 
possessing depictions of animal cruelty for commercial gain. . . . Second, Stevens does 
not support the proposition that a law like the one at issue must satisfy strict 
scrutiny. . . . Third, Stevens expressly left open the possibility that a more narrowly 
drawn statute targeting depictions of animal cruelty might be compatible with the First 
Amendment.  
Id. (citations omitted). 
 112. See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2762 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[I]t) is more difficult to mount 
a facial First Amendment attack on a statute that seeks to regulate activity that involves action 
as well as speech.”) (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma 413 U.S. 601, 614 (1973)). 
 113. See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2732–33.  
 114. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1588 (2010). 
 115. See Cross, supra note 17, at 313 (noting that “supporters of the California bill, 
including James Steyer, the founder of Common Sense Media who played a major role in 
pushing the bill, have made it clear that the games affected would be ‘those rated M or 
higher’”).  
 116. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948). 
 117. Id. See also supra note 66 and accompanying text.  
 118. See infra notes 119–22 and accompanying text.  
 119. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.  
 120. See Winters, 333 U.S. at 519–20 (“[I]t does not seem to us that an honest distributor of 
publications could know when he might be held to have ignored such a prohibition.”). 
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Brown involved the restriction of extremely violent video games.
121
 
In such cases the manufacturers or distributors of the video games 
can easily identify the games they will or will not be punished for due 
to the rating system already in place by the Entertainment Software 
Rating Board (ESRB).
122
 Therefore, the reason the Court did not treat 
violence as obscenity in Winters is not present in Brown. 
By basing its opinion on Stevens and Winters in deciding that 
violence does not fit within Ginsberg,
123
 the majority’s reasoning is 
illogical and lacks common sense.
124
 A more logical approach would 
have been analyzing whether the purpose of the bill was based on 
offensiveness, similar to that of the Seventh Circuit in American 
Amusement Machine.
125
 Instead, the Court used an arbitrary cut-off 
line between violence and nudity based on historical tradition
126
 that 
 
 121. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.  
 122. See Cross, supra note 17, at 309–10. 
 Alarmed by the threat of congressional action and concerned about the ability of 
consumers to make informed choices, the major producers of video games united to 
form the Entertainment Software Association (“ESA”). These producers also created 
the Entertainment Software Rating Board (ESRB) to “independently appl[y] and 
enforc[e] ratings, advertising guidelines, and online privacy principles adopted by the 
computer and video game industry”. . . . Using a system based on the MPAA’s ratings 
for movies, the ESRB assigns a letter rating to a game based on its appropriateness for 
a given age group. The ESRB goes a step further than the MPAA, providing more than 
thirty specific content descriptors that indicate which aspects of the game might raise 
concerns. These descriptors not only provide warning if a game includes violence, 
strong language, or use of controlled substances, they further differentiate the degree 
and quality of the content.  
Id. (alterations in original) (footnotes omitted).  
 123. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2735 (2011) (“The California Act 
. . . does not adjust the boundaries of an existing category of unprotected speech to ensure that a 
definition designed for adults is not uncritically applied to children. . . . Instead, it wishes to 
create a wholly new category of content-based regulation that is permissible only for speech 
directed at children.”).  
 124. See id. at 2747 (Alito, J., concurring) (“As a result of today’s decision, a State may 
prohibit the sale to minors of what Ginsberg described as ‘girlie magazines,’ but a State must 
surmount a formidable (and perhaps insurmountable) obstacle if it wishes to prevent children 
from purchasing the most violent and depraved video games imaginable.”).  
 125. See supra notes 70–76 and accompanying text.  
 126. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2736 (explaining that California would have fared better in the 
creation of a new exception for “violent-as-to-minors” speech “if there were a longstanding 
tradition in this country of specially restricting children’s access to depictions of violence, but 
there is none”). 
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was grounded on inconsistent case law with respect to both obscenity 
and minors alike.
127
  
After classifying the statute as a content-based regulation, the 
Supreme Court struck it down for failing to be “justified by a 
compelling government interest and . . . narrowly drawn to serve that 
interest.”128 If the majority had extended the Ginsberg standard to 
cover violence, the statute, similar to other statutes targeting 
obscenity, would not have been subjected to strict scrutiny.
129
 In other 
words, the statute’s failure to overcome strict scrutiny would not have 
mattered.
130
 Nonetheless, a detailed look into the Court’s reasoning is 
necessary because aspects of the strict scrutiny analysis are flawed. 
Like the Court in Playboy, the majority correctly determined that 
because California lacked evidence, it could not establish a 
compelling government interest for its restriction on violent video 
games.
131
 The majority concluded that there was not an “actual 
problem” because California failed to show a direct causal link 
between violent video games and harm to minors.
132
 Like Justice 
Breyer, one could attempt to undercut the majority
133
 by pointing out 
 
 127. See supra notes 52–53 and accompanying text.  
 128. See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2738.  
 129. See R.A.V. v. St. Paul, Minnesota, 505 U.S. 377, 387 (1992) (explaining that “[t]here 
is no problem whatever, for example, with a State’s prohibiting obscenity (and other forms of 
proscribable expression) . . . for . . . it would not discriminate on the basis of content”). See also 
supra note 78 and accompanying text.  
 130. See SAUNDERS, supra note 32, at 61 (“The most important benefit derived from the 
inclusion of excessively violent materials within the obscene is that there would no longer be a 
need to meet strict scrutiny to justify regulation of such materials.”).  
 131. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2738–39 (noting that “California relie[d] primarily on research of 
Dr. Craig Anderson and a few other research psychologists whose studies purport to show a 
connection between exposure to violent video games and harmful effects on children.”).  
 132. See id. at 2739. All California could show was “some correlation between exposure to 
violent entertainment and minuscule real-world effects, such as children’s feeling more 
aggressive or making louder noises in the few minutes after playing a violent game than after 
playing a nonviolent game.” Id. (footnote omitted). Moreover, Dr. Anderson’s testimony in a 
similar lawsuit admitted that the effects found from children’s exposure to violent video games 
are the same effects found when children watch cartoons starring Bugs Bunny or the Road 
Runner. Id. 
 133. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2769 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Rationalizing why there are 
conflicting studies:  
Like many, perhaps most, studies of human behavior, each study has its critics, and 
some of those critics have produced studies of their own in which they reach different 
conclusions . . . . But associations of public health professionals who do possess . . . 
expertise have reviewed many of these studies and found a significant risk that violent 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol41/iss1/8
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2013]  Do Minors’ First Amendment Rights Make Sense? 171 
 
 
the numerous scientific studies that support California’s views.134 
However, this argument is likely weak at best. For example, Justice 
Breyer’s suggestion would create a balancing test,135 an idea that was 
specifically rejected by Stevens.
136
 In addition, the studies are 
unlikely to be differentiated from the lack of evidence in Playboy.
137
 
The studies relied on by California in Brown have been rejected 
outright by every court to consider them,
138
 analogous to this lack of 
evidence in Playboy.
139
  
Although the majority correctly determined that California lacked 
evidence to prove there was an actual problem involving violent 
video games, it was wrong in two other instances. First, the majority 
erroneously implied that the voluntary rating system
140
 for video 
games was a less restrictive alternative at least as effective as 
California’s statute.141 Specifically, the majority pointed to a 2009 
study by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC),
142
 which found that 
 
video games, when compared with more passive media, are particularly likely to cause 
children harm.  
Id. 
 134. See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2769 (noting over one thousand studies point to a causal 
connection between media violence and aggressive behavior in some children).  
 135. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2766 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
Rather, [than] applying [strict scrutiny mechanically], I would evaluate the degree to 
which the statute injures speech-related interests, the nature of the potentially-justifying 
“compelling interests,” the degree to which the statute furthers that interest, the nature 
and effectiveness of possible alternatives, and, in light of this evaluation, whether, 
overall, “the statute works speech-related harm” [] out of proportion to the benefits that 
the statute seeks to provide. 
Id. 
 136. See Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1577, 1586.  
 137. See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 822 (2000). 
 138. See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2739. See also Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Foti, 451 F. Supp. 
2d 823, 832 (M.D. La. 2006) (“It appears that much of the same evidence has been considered 
by numerous courts and in each case the connection was found to be tenuous and speculative.”).  
 139. See supra notes 90–91 and accompanying text.  
 140. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.  
 141. See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2740–41.  
 142. FTC, REPORT TO CONGRESS, MARKETING VIOLENT ENTERTAINMENT TO CHILDREN 
(Dec. 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/12/P994511violententertainment.pdf. 
This report documents the current state of marketing of violent entertainment products 
to children based upon a review of documents from industry members and Commission 
monitoring of television, print, and Internet advertising. It also assesses pertinent 
revisions to industry self-regulatory policies since the last report . . . . This report also 
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the video game industry outpaced the movie and music industries in 
their respective voluntary rating systems.
143
 Thus, the majority 
concluded that the “system does much to ensure that minors cannot 
purchase seriously violent video games on their own” and in turn is a 
less restrictive alternative.
144
  
However, as Justice Breyer points out, “this voluntary system has 
serious enforcement gaps” and is not a less restrictive alternative due 
to its failure to adequately prevent minors from buying violent 
games.
145
 In addition, this case differs significantly from Playboy, 
where a less restrictive alternative was accurately found.
146
 In 
Playboy, the Government attempted to impose a “blanket ban” on 
television shows, even for adults, in order to protect children.
147
 This 
is distinguishable from Brown because California was strictly 
targeting children. Therefore, because the ESRB rating system in 
place is not equally as effective and the California statute is not a 
blanket ban on adults’ freedom of speech, the majority should have at 
least held that it passes muster under this prong of the strict scrutiny 
standard.  
Next, the majority in Brown incorrectly held that the statute was 
both underinclusive and overinclusive.
148
 The majority pointed out 
two reasons for classifying the statute as underinclusive. The first 
reason is that California only singled out sellers of video games and 
not booksellers, cartoonists, and movie-producers, despite the fact 
 
provides the results of the Commission’s 2009 undercover shopping survey on the 
progress of the three entertainment sectors in enforcing policies restricting children’s 
access to R-rated movies and unrated DVDs, music with Parental Advisory Labels, and 
M-rated games.  
Id. 
 143. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2741 (citing the 2009 FTC Report to Congress, supra note 142). 
Specifically, the Court noted that it outpaced the other industries in: “(1) restricting target-
marketing of mature-rated products to children; (2) clearly and prominently disclosing rating 
information; and (3) restricting children’s access to mature-rated products at retail.” Id. 
 144. Id. at 2741.  
 145. Id. at 2770 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (explaining that in the same 2009 FTC report that 
the majority looks to, “20% of those under 17 are still able to buy M-rated video games, and 
breaking down sales by store, one finds that this number rises to nearly 50% in the case of one 
large national chain.”).  
 146. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
 147. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.  
 148. See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2740–42. 
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that they also subject children to violent speech.
149
 The second reason 
is that “[t]he California Legislature is perfectly willing to leave this 
dangerous, mind-altering material in the hands of children so long as 
one parent (or even an aunt or uncle) says it’s OK.”150 The majority 
also asserted that the statutory coverage is overinclusive because 
“[n]ot all of the children who are forbidden to purchase violent video 
games on their own have parents who care whether they purchase 
violent video games.”151 
The underinclusive and overinclusive rationales articulated by the 
majority both can be critiqued using reasoning similar to Justice 
Alito’s concurring opinion. Specifically, he suggested that the 
interactive nature of video games might well be different from other 
types of media.
152
 Thus, unlike the ordinances in Hialeah,
153
 the 
statute in Brown was not underinclusive because it had a valid reason 
to single out the suppliers of violent video games since such games 
differ from other types of media.
154
 Likewise, there are two separate 
justifications explaining why the statute should not be rendered 
underinclusive simply because it allows children to play violent video 
games if one parent approves. First, the statute is modeled after the 
New York statute in Ginsberg allowing children to possess sexual 
 
 149. Id. at 2740. 
 150. Id. (explaining that there are not “requirements as to how this parental or avuncular 
relationship is to be verified; apparently the child’s or putative parent’s, aunt’s, or uncle’s say-
so suffices, which is not how one addresses a serious social problem”).  
 151. Id. at 2741. 
 152. Id.  
. . . In considering the application of unchanging constitutional principles to new and 
rapidly evolving technology, this Court should proceed with caution. We should make 
every effort to understand the new technology. We should take into account the 
possibility that developing technology may have important societal implications that 
will become apparent only with time. We should not jump to the conclusion that new 
technology is fundamentally the same as some older thing with which we are familiar. 
And we should not hastily dismiss the judgment of legislators, who may be in a better 
position than we are to assess the implications of new technology. . .  
. . . There are reasons to suspect that the experience of playing violent video games just 
might be very different from reading a book, listening to the radio, or watching a movie 
or a television show. 
Id.  
 153. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
 154. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
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material if a parent approves.
155
 Second, as Justice Thomas’s dissent 
points out, there are numerous laws in place that impose restrictions 
on minors unless a parent approves.
156
  
Lastly, categorizing the statute as overinclusive because some 
parents may not care if their children purchase violent video games is 
inaccurate. Unlike in Hialeah,
157
 this flat prohibition is necessary 
because of the ESRB and parents’ failure to adequately monitor 
violent video game purchases.
158
 Furthermore, as recognized in 
Ginsberg, “society’s . . . interest in protecting the welfare of children 
justif[ies] [a] reasonable regulation of the sale of material to them.”159 
Parents may not care if their children look at pictures of sex or 
nudity, yet children are still prohibited from purchasing them. 
Arguments can be made that the statute in Brown was the least 
restrictive alternative and was narrowly tailored (not overinclusive or 
underinclusive). However, due to the lack of evidence presented, an 
argument cannot be made that the statute can meet the compelling 
government interest prong. This failure to meet the compelling 
government interest prong resulted in the Supreme Court striking 
down the statute.
160
 According to Justice Breyer, the Brown decision 
has created a serious “anomaly” in First Amendment law.161 To 
illustrate the law as it currently stands, a minor
162
 is now prohibited 
under Ginsberg from buying a Playboy at a convenient store, even 
though the majority of the magazine consists of articles albeit minor 
nudity. However, this same minor is legally allowed to walk into a 
Gamestop or Bestbuy and purchase a game such as JFK Reloaded.
163
 
 
 155. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.  
 156. See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2758 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that boys could not 
enlist in the military without parental consent and laws that set age limits restricting marriage 
without parental consent).  
 157. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.  
 158. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.  
 159. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 640 (1968) (quoting People v. Kahan, 206 
N.E.2d 333, 334 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1965) (Flud, J., concurring)).  
 160. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2742. 
 161. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.  
 162. “‘Minor’ means any natural person who is under 18 years of age.” CAL. CIV. CODE 
§ 1746(a) (2009).  
 163.  
The stated goal of JFK Reloaded is to debunk assassination conspiracy theories by 
buttressing the Warren Commission’s conclusion that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone 
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Does this make any sense at all? Yes, according to the majority’s 
opinion in Brown.
164
 However, the Supreme Court in Brown should 
have never allowed this “anomaly” to occur, and the Constitution 
should be interpreted correctly.
165
  
III. PROPOSAL 
There are two possible solutions the Supreme Court in Brown 
should have employed to resolve the inconsistencies attached to 
minors’ First Amendment rights, instead of worsening the problem 
and creating the current “anomaly.” It should be noted that neither 
solution advocates for any change to the current obscenity laws with 
respect to adults. The first solution treats violence as obscenity for 
minors, using the Ginsberg standard. The second solution advocates 
for the Supreme Court to overrule its decision in Ginsberg, thereby 
abolishing the obscenity-for-minors standard. Both these solutions 
are similar in that each would help create a more concrete First 
Amendment standard for minors, eliminating the “anomaly” that now 
exists. However, both these solutions are much different. The first 
would lead to greater censorship for minors, whereas the second 
would virtually eliminate censorship for minors.  
A. Treat Violence and Obscenity with Respect to Minors the Same 
Distinctions between children and adults are deeply rooted within 
case law interpreting the Constitution because of the need to protect 
 
and fired only three bullets. So, the game places you in the precise place where Oswald 
stood—the sixth-floor window of the Texas Schoolbook Depository—and challenges 
you to re-create his three shots. . . . The closer you get to matching [Oswald’s] three 
trajectories, the closer you get to a perfect score of 1,000. (The game designers are also 
offering a cash prize to the player who gets the highest score.) . . .  
. . . When [you] finally manage[] to kill JFK and watch[] his head blow open[,] . . . he 
flop[s] forward like a rag doll . . . . 
Clive Thompson, A View to a Kill: JFK Reloaded is Just Plain Creepy, SLATE (Nov. 22, 2004, 
6:34 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/gaming/2004/11/a_view_to_a_kill.html.  
 164. See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2735.  
 165. See supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text.  
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the well-being of our country’s children.166 This solution follows that 
view closely because it treats violence as obscenity for minors. This 
solution mirrors Justice Breyer’s dissent167 because it places violence 
within the context of the Ginsberg obscenity-for-minors standard.
168
 
It differs however, in that it focuses on the offensiveness of violence, 
rather than the resulting harm of violence.
169
  
Comparing the similarities between nudity and violence is at the 
heart of this solution. The Supreme Court in Roth stated that “implicit 
in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as 
utterly without redeeming social importance.”170 Clinging to this 
standard by which obscenity has been judged since its inception, how 
is extreme violence any different from nudity? How is there no 
redeeming social importance when a minor looks at a picture 
containing nudity, but there exists redeeming social importance when 
that minor reenacts the assassination of John F. Kennedy?
171
 
Moreover, is the picture of mere nudity more repulsive or offensive
172
 
than the assassination reenactment? The contradictions exemplified 
by these questions show the non-sensible view in the majority’s 
opinion. Specifically, it fails to recognize how different modern-day 
media is from 1968 media. In 1968, protecting children from images 
of nudity may have been a priority for concerned parents and 
legislatures regarding the development and well-being of children. 
 
 166. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005) (“[A] lack of maturity and an 
underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found in youth more often than in adults and are 
more understandable among the young.”); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982) 
(“[Y]outh is more than a chronological fact. It is a time and condition of life when a person may 
be most susceptible to influence and to psychological damage.”); Sable Communications of 
California, Inc. v. F.C.C., 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (“[T]here is a compelling interest in 
protecting the physical and psychological well-being of minors.”); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 
U.S. 629, 639 (1968) (“The well-being of its children is . . . a subject within the State’s 
constitutional power to regulate.”); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944) (“[The] 
power of the state to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority 
over adults.”). 
 167. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2761 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 168. See supra notes 46–51 and accompanying text.  
 169. This approach uses reasoning similar to that of Judge Posner in American Amusement 
Machine Ass’n. See supra notes 71–74 and accompanying text.  
 170. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).  
 171. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.  
 172. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.  
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But today, with the magnitude of children
173
 playing extremely 
violent video games,
174
 it would hardly be logical to say extreme 
violence is of less concern to parents than nudity.  
Although California’s purpose for its statute was the underlying 
harm caused by violent video games,
175
 the majority should have 
looked beyond its purpose. The Court instead should have placed an 
emphasis on the fact that violence is just as offensive, if not more, 
than nudity. Should different standards exist for two forms of speech 
that are equally as offensive? The majority says yes based on an 
outdated, 1968 Ginsberg standard that existed before the current 
obscenity law even took shape in Miller.
176
 
A solution of this nature would have created a consistent First 
Amendment standard for minors and an observance of the long-
standing tradition in protecting the well-being of children.
177
 
Moreover, it would have eliminated the Court’s concern about 
satisfying strict scrutiny.
178
 Nonetheless, it does suffer from a wave of 
judicial opposition.
179
 Therefore, even if the majority did not place 
controlling weight on Stevens, it may still have found a different 
reason not to treat violence as obscenity, and thus, the statute would 
fail to satisfy strict scrutiny.
180
  
 
 173. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.  
 174. See, e.g., supra note 6 and accompanying text.  
 175. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.  
 176. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2734–35 (2010). 
 177. See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2760 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“‘[T]he tradition of parental 
authority is not inconsistent with our tradition of individual liberty . . . [and l]egal restrictions 
on minors, especially those supportive of the parental role, may be important to the child’s 
chances for full growth and maturity that make eventual participation in a free society 
meaningful and rewarding.’”) (quoting Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638 (1979)). See also 
supra note 166 and accompanying text. 
 178. See SAUNDERS, supra note 32, at 201 (“The recognition that material may be 
sufficiently violent so as to be obscene, removes [the] seemingly insurmountable legislative 
hurdles.”). 
 179. Post, supra note 19, at 38 (stating that courts have been unanimous in not treating 
violence as obscenity, thereby applying strict scrutiny and striking down similar statutes as 
violating the First Amendment).  
 180. Id. at 56 (“[A]ll the fighting [in Brown], about whether or not this statute falls within 
‘the Ginsberg “obscene-as-to-minors” exception,’ were entirely irrelevant to the outcome of the 
case; under this long line of post-Ginsberg precedent, the statute would receive (and cannot 
satisfy) strict First Amendment scrutiny . . . .”). 
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B. Abolish the Obscenity-for-Minors Standard 
Acknowledging the reluctance by courts to treat violence as 
obscenity, this second proposal is an alternative solution that the 
majority in Brown should have applied. It overrules Ginsberg and 
abolishes the obscenity-for-minors standard. This solution may seem 
to run afoul of mainstream modern society, which stresses the 
importance of protecting children from offensive content.
181
 
However, if one believes that extreme violence is no more offensive 
than mere nudity, this solution no more adversely affects the well-
being of children than the current law does. The same obscenity 
standard under Miller for adults would remain unchanged. For 
example, children would be shielded from extreme sexual conduct, 
but not from nudity or violence. Thus, it creates a much more 
consistent First Amendment standard for minors, and brings an end to 
the continuous legislation proposed and the lengthy court proceedings 
that ensue in response.
182
 
Similar to the previous solution, this solution recognizes that the 
shielding of children from mere nudity and not extreme violence is an 
“anomaly” that must be corrected. Advocating that the Supreme 
Court should have overruled Ginsberg “is a significant political and 
legal event . . . because it represents a dramatic form of legal 
change.”183 Most notably, if Ginsberg were to be overruled, there 
would be no separate First Amendment standard dealing with 
obscenity for minors.
184
 Instead, the current First Amendment 
standard for obscenity as to adults would control, ending the tireless 
 
 181. See U.S. Public Says Regulate Violent Video Games, the Focus of Brown v. 
Entertainment Merchants, FAIRLEIGH DICKINSON UNIV. (June 6, 2011), http://publicmind 
.fdu.edu/2011/vmerchants (“Four of seven voters say states should have the ‘right to regulate 
the sale of violent video games in order to protect people under 18, the same way states regulate 
the sale of cigarettes, alcohol, and pornography’ to protect minors. Political independents are 
the most supportive of state power to regulate these games, with two thirds (68%) favoring this 
authority.”).  
 182. See supra note 19 and accompanying text for a list of court cases that have revolved 
around the First Amendment and violent video games.  
 183. John F. Spriggs, Explaining the Overruling of Supreme Court Precedent, 46 J. POL. 
1091, 1092 (2001).  
 184. It must be noted that the solution this proposal advocates for in overruling Ginsberg 
would only create a separate First Amendment standard for minors with respect to obscenity. 
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amount of litigation that arises in connection with minors’ First 
Amendment rights because of Ginsberg.
185
  
Some may argue that overruling Ginsberg is too dramatic of a 
change in First Amendment law, and that following prior precedent, 
or stare decisis, “is not an inexorable command.”186 Accordingly, a 
decision is properly overruled where “development of constitutional 
law since the case was decided has implicitly or explicitly left [it] 
behind as a mere survivor of obsolete constitutional thinking.”187 
Following this line of thought, the decision in Ginsberg came down 
in 1968,
188
 five years before the current Miller obscenity standard
189
 
was developed containing nothing about minors.
190
 The basis for the 
decision in Miller was to limit obscenity because of the dangers 
inherent in censorship.
191
 It is nearly impossible to fathom that had 
Ginsberg been decided after Miller, the Court would have developed 
a lesser standard for minors, thereby allowing more censorship.  
Moreover, “when governing decisions are unworkable or are 
badly reasoned, ‘th[e] Court has never felt constrained to follow 
precedent.’”192 Classifying nudity as unprotected speech while 
ignoring violence based solely on Ginsberg is hardly logical 
reasoning. In following Ginsberg, the Court is consistent with 
precedent but, as demonstrated by the majority in Brown, is 
unworkable. If the Court overrules Ginsberg, future legislatures could 
plainly see that minors are entitled to significant First Amendment 
rights (the same as adults). Accordingly, it would stop legislatures 
from wasting time and resources by continuing to pass bills that will 
never pass constitutional muster. Most importantly however, 
 
 185. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 186. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991). 
 187. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 857 (1992). See also Hein v. Freedom 
From Religion Foundation, Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 618 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Today’s 
opinion is, in one significant respect, entirely consistent with our previous cases . . . . 
Unfortunately, the consistency lies in the creation of utterly meaningless distinctions which 
separate the case at hand from the precedents that have come out differently, but which cannot 
possibly be (in any sane world) the reason it comes out differently.”).  
 188. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).  
 189. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.  
 190. See Miller v. California, 415 U.S. 15 (1973). 
 191. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.  
 192. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (quoting Smith v. Allright, 321 U.S. 
649, 665 (1944)).  
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overruling Ginsberg would fix the current “anomaly” in minors’ First 
Amendment law and finally settle the law correctly.
193
  
CONCLUSION 
The Constitution needs to be interpreted correctly,
194
 and there 
thus needs to be a consistent First Amendment standard for minors. 
The current “anomaly” that is minors’ First Amendment rights could 
have been resolved in Brown by either treating violence as obscenity 
or overruling Ginsberg. Both solutions are more logically sound and 
make more common sense than the current law, yet the Supreme 
Court has failed to implement either solution. Video games remain as 
violent
195
 and as popular as ever.
196
 In response, concerned 
legislatures and parents have sought to impose regulations.
197
 Up 
until this point these attempts have failed in every level of the judicial 
system, most recently with the Supreme Court in Brown. Yet, 
because the majority in Brown failed to develop a clear First 
Amendment standard for minors, concerned legislatures will continue 
trying to pass similar bills in the same circular process, amassed with 
uncertainty.  
 
 193. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.  
 194. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.  
 195. See, e.g., supra note 6 and accompanying text.  
 196. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 197. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
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